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LEARNING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS:
WHEN DISTRICT COURTS SHOULD
DECLINE TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
I. INTRODUCrION
Discussing the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the Fifth Circuit in Whalen v. Carter' stated that, prior to 1990, "[a]
federal district court could exercise 'pendent jurisdiction' over state
claims arising from the same common nucleus of operative fact[s] as
[the] federal claims that confer subject matter jurisdiction., 2 The
thrust of the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs was that while such state claims were within the jurisdiction of
the district courts, "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right," and that the doctrine is justified by
"considerations of judicial economy,. convenience and fairness to liti-
gants."3 The Whalen court went on to discuss the 1990 Congressional
enactment of a "supplemental jurisdiction" statute4 and stated that
"[i]t is unclear whether [28 U.S.C. § 1367] merely codifie[d] the pen-
dent jurisdiction doctrine or actually change[d] the doctrine in some
fashion."5 This statement by the Whalen court presented an issue
that has since received divergent treatment among the circuit courts
of appeals, resulting in at least two separate interpretations of § 1367.
Shortly after the Whalen decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Braz-
inski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co.,6 held that § 1367 merely
"intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made principles of
pendent and pendent party jurisdiction., 7 Less than a year following
the Brazinski decision, the Ninth Circuit handed down its opinion in
1. 954 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1992).
2. Id at 1097 n.10 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966)).
3. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
5. Whalen, 954 F.2d at 1097 n.10.
6. 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993).
7. Id- at 1182.
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Executive Software North America, Inc. v. District Court.8 The Ex-
ecutive Software court held that Congress intended the factors enu-
merated in § 1367(c) "to provide the exclusive means by which sup-
plemental jurisdiction can be declined by a court." 9 The essence of
the Ninth Circuit's Executive Software decision was that district
courts no longer retained the discretion to decline jurisdiction over
state claims, cutting back on the power given to the district courts by
Gibbs. Rather, the new supplemental jurisdiction statute "created a
presumption in favor of jurisdiction."10
This Comment discusses the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts as it relates to supplemental jurisdiction over related
state claims. Part II reviews the common law doctrines of pendent,
ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction. Part III discusses the en-
actment of § 1367 and its provisions. Part IV discusses current pref-
erences in statutory interpretation and the different views among the
circuits as to whether the enactment of § 1367 changed the preexist-
ing common law,11 concluding that the view held by the Seventh Cir-
cuit and others comports with the plain meaning of the statute and
remains faithful to the legislative history of § 1367. Part V provides a
model for applying § 1367(c), focusing on when state claims pre-
dominate under § 1367(c)(2) and when "other compelling reasons"'2
warrant declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4). Finally, Part VI
concludes that, in the absence of post-enactment guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts should look to the plain meaning of the
statute and to the Supreme Court's Gibbs opinion when interpreting
§ 1367.
II. BACKGROUND
As early as 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the ex-
pansive jurisdiction of the federal judiciary by stating that "when a
question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
[C]onstitution... forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
8. 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 1556.
10. See Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
Supplemental Jurisdiction; Removal; Preemption, Abstention, and Diversity, in
CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 121,152 (Sol
Schreiber et al. eds., Supp. 1997).
11. Part IV compares the holdings of Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Addi-
tives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993), and Executive Software North America, Inc.
v. District Court, 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
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power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that
cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in
it.' 13 In Chief Justice Marshall's view, so long as any ingredient of the
case or controversy 4 before the court involved a federal element-no
matter how tenuous the federal element was to the actual substance
of the case-a federal court could hear the claim within the constitu-
tional bounds of the federal judicial power.15
Though a federal court may constitutionally hear any claim with
a federal "ingredient," the broad grant of federal jurisdiction con-.... 16.
tained in the Constitution is not self-executing, and "[b]oth the Con-
stitution and an act of Congress must concur in conferring power
upon the [federal c]ourts."'7 Congress has never authorized federal
jurisdiction to the constitutional limits established by Chief Justice
Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.8
A. Pendent Jurisdiction
In the very distant past, litigants with causes of action giving rise
to both federal and state claims were forced to choose between fore-
going the state claims and pursuing only federal claims in federal
court, bringing both claims in a state court, or simultaneously litigat-
ing in both state and federal courts. 9 In order to avoid duplicative
litigation, and in the interests of "expediency and efficiency,"' 2 the
federal courts developed the doctrines of pendent and ancillary ju-
risdiction, which were ushered into the modem era with United Mine
13. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
14. Courts have interpreted the "case or controversy" requirement of Article
III, Section 2 as including all claims arising from a single set of facts. See Shay S.
Scott, Comment, Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 72 OR. L.
REv. 695, 698 (1993). Therefore, under the Constitution and Osborn, a federal
court may hear an entire matter, even where only part of the matter independ-
ently meets the subject matter jurisdiction requirement. See id.
15. See Jon D. Corey, Comment, The Discretionary Exercise of Supplemental
Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 1995 B.Y.U. L. Rv.
1263, 1265.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the federal judicial power to "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority").
17. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850) (holding that "the dis-
posal of the judicial power ... belongs to Congress; and the courts cannot exer-
cise jurisdiction in every case to which the judicial power extends, without the
intervention of Congress, who are not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts to every subject which the Constitution might warrant").
18. See Corey, supra note 15, at 1265.
19. See id.
20. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984).
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Workers v. Gibbs.2 In its opinion in Gibbs, the Supreme Court noted
the "considerable confusion" among the lower federal courts regard-
ing the power of the federal courts to hear related state claims that
did not themselves have an independent basis of federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.2
Gibbs involved a dispute between different labor unions compet-
ing to represent a group of miners. After Paul Gibbs, a mining su-
pervisor, lost several hauling contracts and eventually his job, he
brought a cause of action against the United Mine Workers of
America. Gibbs brought his suit in federal court, alleging a federal
claim under the Labor Management Relations Act and state law
claims based on conspiracy and tortious interference with a contract.
While the Labor Management Relations Act claim clearly presented
a federal question, there was no independent basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction over his state law claims.24
In affirming the district court's decision to take jurisdiction over
the pendent state claim, the Supreme Court articulated a two-prong
test for determining when the power of pendent jurisdiction could be
exercised over claims made under state law.2 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, held that pendent claim jurisdiction existed
when there was a substantial federal claim over which the court has
proper subject matter jurisdiction and when the state and federal
claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact[s]," such that
a plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judi-
cial proceeding."26 Pendent jurisdiction, therefore, exists whenever
the relationship between the federal and state claims "permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case"' under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitu-
tion.27
While the Supreme Court held that pendent jurisdiction existed
over state law claims if this two-prong test was met, the Court em-
phasized that "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
21. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
22. Id at 724.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 147-197 (1994).
24. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 720.
25. See id at 725.
26. Id.
27. Id. While the Gibbs decision only discussed pendent jurisdiction in terms
of constitutional power, the Court believed that jurisdictional statutes passed by
Congress implicitly authorized jurisdiction over related state claims. See Scott,
supra note 14, at 700 n.30.
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plaintiff's right," and that the justification of the doctrine "lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants."2' If these reasons for asserting federal jurisdiction were not
present, the Gibbs Court directed district courts to "hesitate to exer-
cise jurisdiction over state claims." 29
The Gibbs Court also gave guidance as to when a district court
should refuse to hear related state claims, stating that "[n]eedless
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a
surer-footed reading of applicable law."'0 The Court further held
that jurisdiction should not be exercised over pendent claims if "it
appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in
terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the compre-
hensiveness of the remedy sought. 31 In such a case, "the state claims
may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state
tribunals."3 2 Independent of these "jurisdictional considerations," the
Gibbs Court stated that other reasons might exist that would counsel
against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction and would justify separat-
ing state and federal claims for trial, for example, "the likelihood of
jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief."33
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction
While pendent claim jurisdiction under Gibbs is generally lim-
ited to supporting a state claim arising from the same facts as the
claim arising under federal law,M the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
may be invoked to support jurisdiction over claims brought by parties
other than the original plaintiff. The use of ancillary jurisdiction by
28. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 726-27.
33. Id. at 727.
34. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, at 829
(West Supp. 1993) (describing a federal claim as a "jurisdictional crutch" for the
related state claim).
35. See Thomas Jamison, Note, Pendent Party Jurisdiction: Congress Giveth
What the Eighth Circuit Taketh Away, 17 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 753, 757 n.24
(1991) (describing ancillary jurisdiction as "a mechanism used by defendants and
third parties whose interests would be inadequately protected if their claims were
disallowed in the ongoing federal case," and recognizing that "[a]ncillary juris-
diction usually arises in complex multiple party litigation involving third-party
defendants, compulsory counterclaims, and cross-claims").
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plaintiffs was most significantly restricted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger," which held
that a plaintiff in a diversity suit could not assert a claim against an
impleaded third-party defendant where the new claim would destroy
the requirement of complete diversity.37
This restriction makes sense as a matter of policy; a contrary rule
would allow a plaintiff to artfully plead his claim in order to circum-
vent the statutory requirement38 of complete diversity by "suing only
those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for
them to implead nondiverse defendants."39 Such a rule is also not un-
fair to the plaintiff who could have brought his entire claim in a state
court of general jurisdiction but instead chose a federal forum and,
therefore, "must thus accept its limitations. '
C. Pendent Party Jurisdiction
While Gibbs provided a framework for federal jurisdiction over
separate but related state claims,4' additional issues arise when differ-
ent parties are sued on the state claim but not on the federal claim.42
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of pendent party juris-
diction in Aldinger v. Howard.43
The issue arose in Aldinger when plaintiff Monica Aldinger was
fired from her job with the county treasurer and brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the county and several of its officials
had violated her constitutional rights.44 Aldinger also brought state
claims against the County of Alameda. 45 She sought both injunctive
36. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
37. Id. at 377.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). Although § 1332, which governs federal ju-
risdiction over diversity suits, does not explicitly speak in terms of "complete di-
versity," the statute has been interpreted as carrying forward the long-standing
requirement of complete diversity first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
his opinion in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267 (1806).
39. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 374.
40. Id at 376.
41. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
42. See M. Ashley Harder, Comment, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Sup-
plemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,22 U. BALT. L. REV. 67, 72 (1992).
43. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
44. See id. at 3-4.
45. See id. at 4-5. Since, at the time, courts had interpreted § 1983 as not ex-
tending to municipal corporations, Aldinger was unable to assert a federal claim
against the county. This construction was overruled two years after Aldinger in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 683-88 (1978). See Denis
F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional
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relief and damages.4' Aldinger claimed federal jurisdiction over the
§ 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)47 and claimed pendent ju-
risdiction over the state claims. The Court refused to permit the
pendent party jurisdiction sought in Aldinger4 but limited its holding
to claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1343(a)(3), stating that "'[o]ther
statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call
for a different result."'' 49 The Aldinger decision led to a split among
the courts of appeals on whether or not pendent party jurisdiction
existed in cases where federal jurisdiction was predicated on a federal
question.50
Although the Aldinger Court left the door of pendent party ju-
risdiction slightly oen, Justice Scalia slammed it shut in 1989 in Fin-
ley v. United States and attempted to resolve the split among the cir-
cuits. Finley involved an airplane crash and a subsequent suit by
Barbara Finley, whose husband and children had been killed in the
crash. Mrs. Finley brought an action in federal court against the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.52 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides exclusive federal jurisdic-tion over such a claim.53 Mrs. Finley also brought a state law negli-
and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 849, 883 & n.195 (1992). In addition, no
diversity jurisdiction existed "because both the plaintiff and the county were citi-
zens of Washington." IL at 883.
46. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 4.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) extends federal jurisdiction to "any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person" deprived of a federal consti-
tutional or statutory right, privilege or immunity "under color of any State law."
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1994).
48. The Aldinger Court based its holding on the grounds that jurisdiction
flowing from Article III must be conferred upon the courts by congressional
statute, and because "Congress had excluded counties from liability under
§ 1983, the 'indirect' exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under the guise of
pendent party jurisdiction was impliedly negated." McLaughlin, supra note 45,
at 884 (citations omitted).
49. Id (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18).
50. See Scott, supra note 14, at 706. Some courts rejected pendent party ju-
risdiction in the wake of Aldinger. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196,
1200 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977). Other courts recognized such jurisdiction "where the
main claim [was] a federal-question rather than diversity claim." Price v. Pierce,
823 F.2d 1114, 1119 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant,
Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985)).
51. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
52. See id. at 546.
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994) (providing "exclusive [district court] juris-
diction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government" if the act or omission occurred under circumstances
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gence claim against the San Diego Gas and Electric Company for
their alleged failure to adequately maintain the runway lights at the
airport, a claim over which there was no independent basis for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 4 Without the possibility of pendent party
jurisdiction, Mrs. Finley would have had no choice but to litigate her
cases simultaneously in different fora.s
Despite this compelling case for the exercise of pendent party
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that no federal jurisdiction
existed over the negligence claim. In its opinion in Finley, the Su-
preme Court completely eliminated the doctrine of pendent party
jurisdiction by holding that federal courts could only hear claims
against additional parties where an independent basis for jurisdiction
existed for each claim.56 Although Justice Scalia recognized that such
pendent party jurisdiction was within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion's extension of the judiciary power, he refused to "assume that
the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized,"
and stated that the Supreme Court would not read jurisdictional stat-
utes so broadly as to include the pendent party jurisdiction sought 7
In so holding, however, the Supreme Court invited Congress to over-
rule the Finley decision and to extend the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to claims against additional parties. 8
III. THE ENACTMENT OF 28 U.S.C. § 1367: WHAT DID
CONGRESS SAY?
In 1990, at the invitation of the Supreme Court and on the rec-
ommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee , Congress
codified the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion, overruled the Supreme Court's Finley decision, and created ju-
risdiction over both additional claims and parties.' ° Congress also
eliminated the distinction between pendent and ancillary claim juris-
diction by bringing both types of jurisdiction under the single heading
in which the United States would be liable to the plaintiff if the Government
were a private person).
54. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546.
55. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
56. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
57. Id. at 549.
58. See id. at 556 (stating that "[w]hatever we say regarding the scope of ju-
risdiction ... can of course be changed by Congress").
59. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6860.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
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of "supplemental jurisdiction."'"
The new statute provided, with limited exceptions, that district
courts "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article IH
of the United States Constitution."62 The statute also specifically
provides for supplemental jurisdiction over "claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties."6' The exception to this
broad grant of federal jurisdiction is § 1367(b), which excepts from
the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts claims made by
plaintiffs in diversity actions "against persons made parties under
Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19
... , or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24," if the joinder
of the additional claims "would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332."64 Section 1367(b) is congressional
61. See id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that multiple plaintiffs as-
serting federal jurisdiction solely on diversity grounds be completely diverse and
have an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. In Patterson Enterprises v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Kan. 1993), the court held that
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973)-which held that
"multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the juris-
dictional-amount requirement"--was overruled by the plain language of § 1367.
See Patterson, 812 F. Supp. at 1154. The Patterson court, however, stated that the
legislative history of § 1367 indicates that Congress did not intend to abrogate the
requirement of independent satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount require-
ment in class actions. See id. This statement has since been cast into doubt by
opinions from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.
In Free v. Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, held that "under § 1367
a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class,
although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement" if the class
representatives met the requirement. In Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit went even fur-
ther, holding that no plaintiff need individually meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement. The Stromberg court stated that "[i]f § 1367(a) allows suit by a
pendent plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional amount but not the diversity re-
quirement, it also allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who satisfies the diversity re-
quirement but not the jurisdictional amount." Id- at 931. But see Spellman v.
Meridian Bank, 1995 WL 764548, at *7-8 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 1995) (not reported in
F.3d) (stating, in dicta, that a district court will lack jurisdiction if the named
plaintiff in a class action fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement)
(affirmed en banc on other grounds; sub nom Deffner v. Corestates Bank of
Delaware, N.A., 92 F.3d 1170 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision)).
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recognition and acceptance of the Supreme Court's concerns over the
use of ancillary jurisdiction to circumvent the requirement of com-
plete diversity, as expressed by the Court in its opinion in Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger."
In addition to the limits of subsection (b), a district court "may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" if the claim "raises a
novel or complex issue of State law" or "substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original ju-
risdiction," or if "the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction," or if there are otherwise
"exceptional circumstances,... [due to the existence of] other com-
pelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."" This discretionary lan-
guage appears to codify the Gibbs test for those instances when a
court should decline pendent jurisdiction.67
Section 1367, by its terms, neither allows nor prohibits a district
court from remanding federal claims to state court when the court
exercises its discretion to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c). In In
re City of Mobile," however, the court held that "[s]ection 1367(c)
cannot be fairly read as bestowing on district courts the discretion to
remand to a state court a case that includes a properly removed fed-
eral claim. ' 69 While the City of Mobile court recognized that § 1367(c)
gives courts the discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental juris-
diction and acknowledged that "ostensibly compelling reasons" ex-
isted in that case for remanding the entire case to state court under
§ 1367(c)(2) and (4), the court found no support for the district
court's decision to remand in the language of 1367(c), "its legislative
history, or [the] relevant case law. ,
70
Section 1367(d) recognizes that serious statutes of limitation
problems may arise for plaintiffs whose state claims have been dis-
missed by the district court.71 Section 1367(d) provides that the
"period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dis-
missed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under
65. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 & n.16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6875.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
67. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
68. 75 F.3d 605 (11th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 607 (citing Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 787
(3d Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. at 607-08.
71. See Siegel, supra note 34, at 836.
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subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period."72
IV. DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION To DECLINE JURISDICTION
UNDER § 1367(C): WHAT DID CONGRESS MEAN?
A. Interpreting the Language of the Statute: Under What
Circumstances May a District Court Decline Jurisdiction?
When the language of a statute "is clear and does not demand an
absurd result," current Supreme Court doctrine directs lower courts
to look to the language of the statute as "the sole repository of con-
gressional intent."73 While legislative history is not irrelevant to
statutory interpretation, "[t]he best evidence of [legislative intent] is
the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted
to the President."74 Clear and unambiguous statutory language may
not "be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legis-
lators or committees during the course of the enactment process."75
Though the mandatory language of § 1367(a)--"district courts shall
have jurisdiction"-when read with § 1367(c)'s discretionary lan-
guage--"district courts may decline to exercise supplemental juris-
diction"-arguably creates ambiguity, thereby allowing deviation
from the normal rules of statutory interpretation, § 1367 may be
fairly read as consistent among its provisions and may be literally
applied without reaching absurd results. This notwithstanding, nei-
ther courts nor commentators have agreed on how § 1367 should be
interpreted.
Post-enactment case law illustrates the confusion in which the
language of § 1367 has left the federal courts. Though § 1367(c) ap-
pears to be a codification of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, which
gave federal courts discretion to decline jurisdiction over state claims,76courts have read the language of § 1367 as being "loaded in favor of
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
73. Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc.
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1991)).
74. West Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 98.
75. Id- at 98-99 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
241 (1989)).
76. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,726 (1966).
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retaining jurisdiction." 77 This result is reached by comparing § 1367(a)
with § 1367(c)'s discretionary language, which appears to specifically
limit the circumstances under which a district court may decline ju-
risdiction over a state claim.
Assuming that a court interpreting § 1367 should consult the
statute's legislative history, the fact that very little history preceded
the enactment of § 1367 adds to this confusion. To begin with, the
Senate Report submitted with the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990,78 which enacted § 1367, contains no mention of the statute and
therefore gives no guidance as to its underlying legislative intent.79 In
addition, the analysis of the bill regarding supplemental jurisdiction
contained in the House Report is less than three total pages in
length."' What little the House Report does provide, however, gives
valuable insight into the legislative purposes underlying § 1367.
In describing the purpose and prospective application of the
statute, the House Report states that
[s]ubsection [1367](a) generally authorizes the district court
to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim whenever
it forms part of the same constitutional case or controvery
as the claim or claims that provide the basis of the district
court's original jurisdiction .... In doing so, subsection (a)
codifies the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs."
This passage delivers two important messages to courts seeking
to properly interpret the statute: (1) section 1367 authorizes-but
does not command-a court to exercise jurisdiction over supplemen-
tal claims; and (2) section 1367 is intended to be a codification of the
Supreme Court's analysis in Gibbs, which held that "pendent juris-
diction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."
's2
77. See Vairo, supra note 10, at 151-52.
78. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113 (codified in scattered sections of Title
28 U.S.C.).
79. The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill after its language was
amended to contain much of the text of the Senate bill. See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802. The Senate Report, does not address the topic of supplemental jurisdic-
tion. See S. RBP. No. 101-416 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6873-76.
81. Id. at 28-29 & n.15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6874-75 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
82. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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Opponents of such a construction of § 1367 focus on the discus-
sion included in Professor David D. Siegel's Practice Commentary
following the text of § 1367 in the annotated version of the United
States Code.8 Professor Siegel writes that
[t]he operative verb is "may," importing its usual broad de-
gree of discretion, so that there may be a temptation to
conclude that what Congress has given with one hand-
under subdivision (a) the court "shall have" supplemental
jurisdiction-it has taken away with the other, or permitted
the judges to take away with the "may decline" language of
subdivision (c). But the decline must be based on one of the
four numbered grounds set forth in subdivision (c).'
In his discussion of § 1367(c), Professor Siegel states that sub-
sections (c)(1) and (2) codify "abstention doctrines under which a
federal court can stay or dismiss a claim with heavy state law ele-
ments." '5 Professor Siegel believes that subdivision (1) codifies the
doctrine of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,86 commonly re-
ferred to as the "Pullman abstention," and that subdivision (2) codi-
fies the common law abstention doctrine created in Burford v. Sun
Oil Co.,8 7 and developed through subsequent case law.8 Subsection
(c)(3) provides a basis for declining supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim once all federal claims-the jurisdictional "crutches"
supporting any state law claim-have been dismissed."
In explaining subdivision (4), Professor Siegel, referring to the
House Report, states that
clause (4) was.., included just to be sure that the court can
decline supplemental jurisdiction in other "exceptional cir-
cumstances" that present "compelling reasons." While ap-
pearing to constitute a separate category for declining sup-
plemental jurisdiction, distinct from the first three, the
language of clause (4) would also appear to indicate that all
declinations of supplemental jurisdiction should be reserved
83. See Siegel, supra note 34.
84. Id. at 834.
85. Id.
86. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
87. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
88. See Siegel, supra note 34, at 835. But see infra notes 202-06 and accompa-
nying text.
89. See Siegel, supra note 34, at 835. For a more thorough discussion of sub-
sections (c)(1)-(4) and their application, see Part V, infra.
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for situations in which there are "compelling reasons. '
Professor Siegel misstates the legislative history. The House Report
reads that subsection (c) "codifies the factors that the Supreme Court
has [previously] recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which
a district court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim,
even though it is empowered to hear the claim."9' In addition,
"[s]ubsection (c)(4) acknowledges that occasionally there may exist
other compelling reasons for a district court to decline supplemental
jurisdiction, which the subsection does not foreclose a court from
considering in exceptional circumstances."
2
The Practice Commentary is incorrect to the extent that it views
subdivision (4) as anything less than a completely separate ground
upon which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction, and not merely a qualification as to when the first three
grounds may be used. It is true that any declination of jurisdiction
"must be based on one of the four numbered grounds set forth in
subdivision (c)." It may also be true that "all declinations of sup-
plemental jurisdiction should be reserved for situations in which
there are 'compelling reasons."' 94 If this is the case, however, it is not
to say that subdivisions (1)-(3) provide the only instances in which
declination is acceptable and that if the court intends to employ one
of those grounds to decline jurisdiction, it must be in a case where
there are additional compelling reasons.95 Rather, if § 1367 requires
all declinations to be based on one of the four numbered grounds set
forth in subdivision (c), the better view is that, by enumerating the
grounds contained in subdivisions (1)-(3), Congress has merely codi-
fied situations in which the Supreme Court had already decided that
circumstances are "exceptional" and in which jurisdiction should be
declined.9' In addition, different circumstances may provide other
90. Siegel, supra note 34, at 836.
91. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Siegel, supra note 34, at 834.
94. 1d. at 836.
95. Professor Siegel's view was even rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Execu-
tive Software North America, Inc. v. District Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("We therefore reject the interpretation, suggested by some courts and
commentators, that 'compelling' in § 1367(c)(4) should be read back into §
1367(c)(1)-(3) in the sense that an exercise of discretion under those categories
should be made only in narrower circumstances than permitted under their
Gibbs counterparts.").
96. These situations are apparently taken directly from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Gibbs. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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"compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."9
B. Reading § 1367 Through the Judicial Gloss: Is § 1367(c) Intended
to Codify Gibbs's Grant of Discretion or to Change the Analysis?
The academic debate rages on over what interpretation of § 1367(c)
correctly states when a district court "may decline to exercise sup-
plemental jursdiction... under subsection (a)."9 ' In practice, courts
have disagreed over whether § 1367 was merely intended to overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States" and to codify
the doctrines of pendent, ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction,
while at the same time preserving the discretion to decline jurisdic-
tion that district courts enjoyed under Gibbs. The Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have perhaps taken the most definitive stands on the issue,
with other circuits falling somewhere in between-though generally
aligning themselves with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation. Below,
the author reviews the decisions of both the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits, tracking closely the language used by the courts in an attempt
to explain such divergent interpretations of what appears to be rela-
tively clear statutory language.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Legal scholars have suggested that § 1367(c)(4) is
congressional recognition and codification of language taken from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976). In his Colorado River opinion, Justice Brennan held that
"[a]bdication of [a district court's] obligation to decide cases can be justified un-
der [the doctrine of abstention] only in the exceptional circumstances where the
order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest." 424 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added) (quoting County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). For a discussion
of the abstention doctrines in the context of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
and of other circumstances previously recognized as "compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction," see Part V.C., infra.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
99. See, e.g., Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1563 (vacating remand order of
district court that interpreted § 1367 "as merely allowing [the c]ourt, at its discre-
tion, to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental parties, which was previously
foreclosed by Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)").
100. While the discussion that follows may seem to contain a good deal of ex-
traneous information regarding the underlying facts and procedural postures of
the cases reviewed, it is important to understand the facts and lower court rulings
in order to more easily comprehend how the cases arrived at the decision-
rendering appellate court.
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1. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co. and the Seventh
Circuit's "mere codification" approach
In Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co.,' the Seventh
Circuit took a definitive stand on the meaning of § 1367(c), holding
that the enactment of § 1367 "carried forward rather than extin-
guished" the practice of the district courts of exercising discretion to
relinquish jurisdiction over pendent claims when appropriate.'
12
Judge Richard Posner, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel,
further stated that "[t]he legislative history indicates that the new
statute is intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made
principles of pendent and pendent party jurisdiction," and that this
view of § 1367 "is also the view of the courts and ... commenta-
tors."' Describing the judicial practice carried forward through the
enactment of § 1367, Judge Posner stated that the system was not an
inflexible one, but rather a system vesting discretion in the district
courts to remand state claims to the state courts.1°4
The Brazinski decision turned on an interpretation of § 1367(c)(3),
perhaps the easiest of the § 1367(c) exceptions to apply. Section
1367(c) (3) provides that a district judge "may" relinquish supplemen-
tal jurisdiction if the main claim is dismissed, codifying a long-
recognized feature of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction ---that a
judge can relinquish supplemental jurisdiction once the jurisdictional
"crutch" is removed, or alternatively, may retain jurisdiction over
what is now a wholly state law matter between nondiverse parties in
order "to save the parties the expense of having to try the pendent
claim twice."10
101. 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993).
102. Id. at 1182.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Because "jurisdiction is measured at the time
[an] action is filed," federal jurisdiction over a remaining state claim is not consti-
tutionally insufficient. Smith v. Campbell, 450 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1971)
(citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)).
Nonetheless, this exception has long been recognized by the federal courts. See,
e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 766 n.3 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that
"[d]ismissal of [a] pendent state law claim was ... proper where the federal claim
could be dismissed on a preliminary motion"); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339
F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that "pendent jurisdiction over a claim under
state law requiring a plenary trial on the merits should not be exerted when the
federal claim is dismissed prior to trial").
106. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1182 (citing Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233,
243 (7th Cir. 1991); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 458-59 (7th
Cir. 1982)). Judge Posner would likely approve of retaining jurisdiction over a
1010
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Brazinski involved an action brought by eight female workers
challenging video surveillance in the workplace. The plaintiffs con-
tended that a video camera placed in a women's locker-room violated
their tort right of privacy."' Defendants removed the case on the
grounds that it actually arose under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act"'
and not under state tort law."0 9 Without explanation, District Judge
William L. Beatty remanded the entire case to state court."' Amoco
then successfully sought mandamus relief from the Seventh Circuit,
which ordered Judge Beatty to retain the case."' Judge Beatty next
granted summary judgment for Amoco on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had failed to file a grievance within the thirty days allowed
by the collective bargaining agreement, and "having thus failed to
exhaust their remedies under the agreement were not entitled to re-
cover anything under it.""
2
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal, charging that the filing of a
grievance would have been futile and, as such, was not required.
3
Amoco responded that in so arguing, the plaintiffs were "attempting
to reopen issues settled by [the Seventh Circuit's] previous decision,
which established the law of the case."1 4 While the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Amoco was correct, the instant appeal presented a
"curious wrinkle" not present in the first matter." Although in the
first action all eight plaintiffs were referred to as employees of
Amoco, one of them was actually an employee of a different com-
pany who simply Fperformed work at Amoco's facility at the time of
the surveillance. Since this plaintiff, Tracy Jones, was not an em-
ployee of Amoco, she was also not a party to the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and her suit for the infringement of her right of pri-
vacy "could not possibly be construed as a suit 'really' arising under
dependent state claim after the dismissal of the federal claim if retention met the
Gibbs values of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. See
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
107. See Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1178.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
109. Defendants claimed the suit arose under the Taft-Hartley Act because it
required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. See Brazinski, 6
F.3d at 1178.
110. See id.
111. See In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir.
1992).
112. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1178.
113. See id at 1179.
114. Id. (citing Williams v. Commissioner, 1 F.3d 502,503-04 (7th Cir. 1993)).
115. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1181.
116. See id.
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section 301 [of the Taft-Hartley Act]." 7
Since complete diversity was lacking between the parties to
Jones's suit, and because her suit presented no federal question, it
was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts "if at
all only by virtue of the concept of 'pendent party' jurisdiction, which
several years ago the Supreme Court squashed in [Finley v. United
States]. ' i8 Judge Posner noted, however, that Congress had over-
ruled Finley through its enactment of § 1367, providing for pendent
party jurisdiction as a component of the newly created "supplemental
jurisdiction.11 9
While the Brazinski court held that a suit like Jones's was within
the jurisdiction of the court, they emphasized that prior to the enact-
ment of § 1367, the "rule[s] that if the main claim had not been tried,
the pendent claim must be dismissed, and [that if the main claim] had
been tried, the pendent claim must be retained.., were at most pre-
sumptions. 1 2' The analysis for whether a state claim should be re-
tained by the district court depended then and still depends on
whether "considerations of judicial economy warranted retention and
decision [on the state claims] rather than relinquishment of the case
to the state court."
121
By § 1367(c) standards, Brazinski is a simple case. Its bare
holding enforces a well-established and sound policy of judicial econ-
omy. The case involved two types of plaintiffs-one raising a federal
question and the other raising only state law claims. Once a district
court dismisses the claim arising under federal law it "may," pursuant
to § 1367, decline jurisdiction over the state claim or, if the interests
of judicial economy so counsel, render final judgment on the claim.
The same logic would apply if the case involved one plaintiff bringing
both federal and state claims and having all federal claims dismissed
before trial.12
The Brazinski decision, however, stands for a larger, more im-
portant principle than this holding. While properly deciding that the
117. L
118. Id- (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)).
119. See id.
120. ME at 1182 (citations omitted).
121. Id- (citing Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 941 F.2d 302, 308 (5th
Cir. 1991); Disher v. Information Resources, Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir.
1989); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 790 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (7th Cir. 1985)).
122. See, e.g., Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191
(2d Cir. 1996).
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plaintiff's wholly state law claim was meritless, the Brazinski court
established that the discretion of the federal courts survived the en-
actment of § 1367.
2. Executive Software North America, Inc. v. District Court and the
Ninth Circuit's "presumption of jurisdiction" approach
In its decision in Executive Software North America, Inc. v. Dis-
trict Court,2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a different
interpretation of § 1367 than that adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
its Brazinski decision less than one year earlier. The Executive Soft-
ware court held that a district court did not have the discretion to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state
claims on the ground that "'retention of the state claims [would] re-
quire[ the expenditure of substantial judicial time and effort."'
12 4
The Executive Software court further held that District Judge Harry
L. Hupp had erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over pendent
state claims without providing written reasons which would enable a
reviewing court to determine whether he had relied on statutorily
permissible factors in declining jurisdiction'.'2 Finally, the court con-
cluded that Judge Hupp's incorrect application of the law was
"clearly erroneous," and therefore, warranted mandamus relief.
121
The Executive Software decision involved an employment dis-
crimination case brought by Donna Page against her employers,
Craig and Sally Jensen (the Jensens?, and Executive Software North
America, Inc. (Executive Software). 27 Ms. Page, a black female, filed
her complaint in state court, claiming to have experienced several
acts of discrimination during the period of her employment with Ex-
ecutive Software, including an allegation that the company required
all of its employees to study the writings of L. Ron Hubbard and the
Church of Scientology. 28 Having refused to comply with such in-
structions, Page was charged by the Jensens with having made a
number of errors in her work and was terminated when she at-
121tempted to contest the charges. Page complained that the chargesagainst her and her ultimate termination "were a mere 'subterfuge
123. 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. Id at 1560 (alterations in original) (citation omitted in original).
125. See id. at 1561.
126. See id. at 1562.
127. See id. at 1548.
128. See i&J
129. See id.
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for illegal discrimination against non believers in the Church of Sci-
entology, women and racial minorities.""'13
Page asserted a Title VII31 claim for unlawful employment dis-
crimination and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32 Page
also alleged three state law claims: a claim of unlawful religious and
racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act; 33 a claim under the state constitution for wrongful
termination;TM and a common law claim for negligent supervision.
The defendants promptly removed the action to federal court
based on the two federal claims, after which the district court sua
sponte issued an order to show cause why the state law claims should
not be remanded to state court.' In issuing this order, the district
court held that "'jurisdiction over the state claims depends upon [the
court's] discretion to retain [them].' ' 137 The court counseled the par-
ties that "'the parameters of a federal court's supplemental jurisdic-
tion [were defined by the Supreme Court's opinion] in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,"' and that the court did "'not interpret the... en-
actment of [s]ection 1367 as restricting the discretionary factors set
forth in Gibbs., 3'  Rather, the court interpreted § 1367 "as merely
allowing [the c]ourt, at its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental parties, which was previously foreclosed by Finley v.
United States."B9 The district court concluded that even if the Gibbs
test were met,
a federal court [retained] discretion to decline jurisdiction
over state law claims if, for instance, the state claims sub-
stantially predominate, the state claims involve novel or
complex issues of state law, trial of the state and federal
claims together is likely to result in jury confusion, or reten-
tion of the state claims requires the expenditure of substan-
tial additional judicial time and effort."
The district court ultimately remanded the state law claims without
130. Id. (citation omitted in original).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
132. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1548.
133. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
134. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
135. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1548.
136. See id.
137. Id. (citation omitted in original).
138. Id (citation omitted).
139. Id at 1548-49.
140. Id at 1548 (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27).
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141providing any justification for the remand .
Unable to appeal the district court's decision to remand the state
law claims,142 the Jensens and Executive Software petitioned the
Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to
retain jurisdiction over the state law claims, contending that the dis-
trict court had "misapprehended the scope of the supplemental ju-
risdiction statute... and failed to undertake the case-specific analysis
required by that statute."' 43 The petitioners argued "that mandamus
[was the] only means of remedying this asserted error" that could not
be justified "on a proper application of section 1367."'
44
The Ninth Circuit held that mandamus relief for the Jensens was
appropriate, finding that the district court had not only abused its
discretion in remanding the plaintiff's state law claims, but also that it
had "clearly erred" in its interpretation of § 1367.145 Discussing the
propriety of a mandamus remedy for the Jensens, the Ninth Circuit
held that such an extraordinary remedy may only be obtained "'to
compel [an inferior court] to exercise its authority when it is its duty
to do so,"'" 6 indicating that a district court judge has a duty to exercise
jurisdiction over state claims when such claims are properly within
the court's jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit could have dispelled any concern over
whether judges were properly declining jurisdiction over state claims
under § 1367(c)(4) by simply requiring a district court, as it did, to
"articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional in addi-
tion to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction in such circum-
stances.'4 The Executive Software court, however, went much fur-
ther. The court held that by using mandatory language in § 1367(a),'
48
141. See id. at 1549.
142. The Jensens were unable to immediately appeal the decision of the dis-
trict court because such orders are not considered a "final decision" for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 absent the
district judge's certification of the appeal.
143. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1548.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1552.
146. Id- at 1550 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (quoting
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,26 (1943))) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1558.
148. Subsection 1367(a) states that district courts "shall have supplemental ju-
risdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy un-
der Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis
added).
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limited only by § 1367(b),4  Congress "intended section 1367(c) to
provide the exclusive means by which supplemental jurisdiction can
be declined by a court."' 50 The court stated that a contrary intepreta-
tion "would appear to render section 1367(c) superfluous."' '
"Accordingly, unless a court properly invokes a section 1367(c) cate-
gory in exercising its discretion to decline to entertain pendent
claims, supplemental jurisdiction must be asserted." 52
The Executive Software court went on to state that the enact-
ment of § 1367(c) in fact "change[d] the nature of the Gibbs discre-
tionary inquiry; ' ' that the Gibbs-era inquiry of whether the asser-
tion of pendent jurisdiction "'best accomodate[d] the values of
economy[,] convenience, fairness and comity, .. was changed; and
that the new statute "channels the application of the underlying val-
ues to a greater degree than the Gibbs regime"'ss-meaning that
Congress had already performed the value-weighing inquiry previ-
ously left to the courts.
The Executive Software court held that Congress, in enacting
subsections (c)(1)-(3), had "codif[ied] concrete applications of the
underlying Gibbs values recognized in preexisting case law,"' 6 and
provided that "the 'catchall' provided by subsection (c)(4) should be
interpreted in a similar manner."1' The court reasoned that by pro-
149. Subsection 1367(b) excepts from the jurisdiction of the federal courts
claims made by plaintiffs in diversity actions "against persons made parties under
Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19.. ., or seeking to inter-
vene as plaintiffs under Rule 24" if the joinder of the additional claims "would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." 28 U.S.C. §
1367(b).
150. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1556 (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added). For this proposition, the Executive Software court
cited to the Third Circuit case of Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983
F.2d 1277, 1285 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). In his dissent in Executive Software, Judge
Leavy questioned the majority's reliance on the Growth Horizons opinion and
cited the same case for an opposite conclusion. See infra notes 166-69 and ac-
companying text.
153. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1556.
154. lId at 1556 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351
(1988)).
155. Id.
156. L-
157. Id at 1557 (citations omitted). The court previously stated that, while
subsections (c)(1)-(3) appear to have codified most of the concrete applications
of the Gibbs values so far recognized by the courts, subsection (c)(4) carries for-
ward the possibility of their extension. See id. at 1551-52.
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viding that declination of jurisdiction under subsection (c)(4) be
made- "only in 'exceptional circumstances[,]' Congress has sounded a
note of caution that the bases for declining jurisdiction should be ex-
tended beyond... [those] identified in subsections (c)(1)-(3) only if
the circumstances are quite unusual." ' Based on this interpretation
of § 1367(c)(4), the Executive Software court would require a district
court seeking to decline jurisdiction over a state claim under subsec-
tion (c)(4) to not only "balance the underlying [Gibbs] values," as re-
quired by the Gibbs Court, but also to undertake the additional task
of "demonstrat[ing] how the circumstances confronted are
'exceptional..' 1 .9
The Executive Software court stated that this additional inquiry
was "not particularly burdensome."' 6 Yet, when read together with
the court's implication that district courts have a duty to exercise ju-
risdiction over state claims whenever they have the power to exercise
such jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has altered a district court's
analysis of when declinations of jurisdiction are appropriate. As a re-
suit, the Ninth Circuit has significantly raised the bar which a party
seeking the dismissal of state claims must clear. If the Executive
Software court's holding did not, by implication, sufficiently distance
itself from the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of § 1367, then the
court expressly stated that it "reject[ed] the Seventh Circuit's broad
dicta that 'the new statute is intended to codify rather than to alter
the judge-made principles of pendent... jurisdiction.""62
C. And the Winner Is...: Illustrating the Correctness of the Seventh
Circuit Approach
The opinion of the Brazinski court and Judge Leavy's dissent in
Executive Software find support in the legislative history and the
plain language of § 1367. Writing against the background of Brazin-
ski-and citing frequently to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbs-
Judge Leavy exposed the weaknesses in the majority's interpretation
of § 1367. He emphasized that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
was, and always had been, a "'doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs
158. Id. at 1558.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
162. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1559 n.12 (quoting Brazinski v. Amoco Pe-
troleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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right."" In so writing, Judge Leavy remained faithful to a Ninth
Circuit opinion'6 he had authored just two years earlier, in which he
emphasized the discretion of the distict courts to hear state claims
over which there existed no independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion.16s
In a "plain meaning" attack on the Executive Software majority's
conclusion that § 1367 commanded district courts to exercise juris-
diction over any nonexceptional case properly within the court's ju-
risdiction, Judge Leavy cited the Third Circuit's opinion in Growth
Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County'6--also cited by the majority for a
contrary and, according to Judge Leavy, "puzzling" purpose.1 The
Growth Horizons court, in an opinion by Judge Walter K. Stapleton,
held that "'[t]he language in § 1367 expressly ... states that federal
courts shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims
arising out of the same case or controversy and may decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction [as provided by § 1367(c)].""6' Judge Leavy argued
that he was unable to "find the words 'shall exercise jurisdiction' in
the statute," which reads "shall have supplemental jurisdiction,"-a
phrase which "is further clarified by the exceptions in subsection
(c).
169
Judge Leavy's argument is simple and rational. It comports with
the plain meaning of the statutory language and is likely in accord
with congressional intent. Section 1367 allows a district court to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over state claims arising from the same nucleus of
operative facts as the federal claims over which the court has original
jurisdiction. The statute further allows a district court to use its dis-
cretion to decline jurisdiction over state claims if the Gibbs values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity170 are not served
by the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Neither the statute nor what
exists of its legislative history command district courts to exercise the
jurisdiction which Congress has authorized, and courts should not
create such a requirement on their own.
163. Id. at 1563 (Leavy, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).
164. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1992).
165. See id at 1309 (stating that "[t]he exercise of pendent jurisdiction to hear
state claims is within the discretion of the federal district court").
166. 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993).
167. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1564 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (citing Growth Horizons, 983 F.2d at 1285 n.14) (alteration in origi-
nal).
169. IE (emphasis added).
170. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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The legislative history of § 1367 also supports the argument that
district courts "should consider and weigh [the Gibbs values] in each
case, and at every stage of the litigation,"'7 and that they should re-
tain discretion to exercise jurisdiction over a case involving state-law
claims. Though Congress did not directly address the discretion of
the district courts in § 1367, the Federal Courts Study Committee,
appointed by the Chief Justice and at the direction of Congress,
stated that "[t]hese supplemental forms of jurisdiction... may be ex-
ercised in the discretion of the federal courts, enabl[ing] them to take
full advantage of the rules on claim and party joinder to deal eco-
nomically ... with matters arising from the same transaction or oc-
currence."
72
Furthermore, the House Report accompanying the final version
of § 1367 states that
[the statute] codifies the factors that the Supreme Court has
recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a dis-
trict court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental
claim, even though it is empowered to hear the claim. Sub-
section (c)(1)-(3) codifies the factors recognized as relevant
under current law. Subsection (c)(4) acknowledges that oc-
casionally there may exist other compelling reasons for a
district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction, which the
subsection does not foreclose a court from considering in
exceptional circumstances.' 3
Finally, the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Executive
Software puts it in conflict with other circuits. 74 In his dissent, Judge
Leavy pointed out that the Third,75 Fifth, 76 and Seventh'" Circuits all
171. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,350 (1988).
172. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 47 (April 2,1990).
173. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6875.
174. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1564 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
175. See Growth Horizons, 983 F.2d at 1284 (finding that a district court
should consider the "generally accepted principles of 'judicial economy, conven-
ience, and fairness to the litigants"' in determining whether to remand state
claims pursuant to section 1367(c)).
176. See Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling reasons" existed to
remand state claims (1) when identical claims were pending in a state court and
(2) when decisions of state law by a federal court "would be a pointless waste of
judicial resources").
177. See Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that § 1367 was "intended to codify rather than to alter the
judge-made principles of pendent and pendent party jurisdiction").
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favor an interpretation of § 1367 that allows a district court to main-
tain the discretion it enjoyed under Gibbs. This choice comports with
the plain meaning of the statute and is sound policy as a matter of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.
V. EXERCISING A COURT'S DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION
OVER STATE CLAIMS UNDER § 1367(c)-A MODEL FOR
APPLICATION
Congress has authorized supplemental jurisdiction over "all...
claims that are so related to claims... within [the] ... original juris-
diction [of the district court] that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article Im of the United States Constitution."'1 78
In creating such jurisdiction, Congress has also preserved the discre-
tion of the district courts to "decline to exercise supplemental juris-
diction" over a state claim if the claim "raises a novel or complex is-
sue of State law;" '179 if the state claim "substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original ju-
risdiction;""18 if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction;"'' or "in exceptional circumstances,...
[due to the existence of] other compelling reasons for declining ju-
risdiction."1' Though these four categories provide the exclusive
means by which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over related state claims, application of the § 1367(c)
categories has been less than uniform, at times creating unsound re-
sults. At best, this lack of uniformity leaves litigators unable to pre-
dict when a federal court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over
state claims. The following sections of this Comment review the
application of the § 1367(c) categories. Subpart A discusses the rela-
tively straightforward application of §§ 1367(c)(1) and (3). Subpart B
discusses when state claims "substantially predominate" over a claim
within the district court's original jurisdiction for purposes of § 1367(c)(2).
Finally, Subpart C discusses when "exceptional circumstances" and
"compelling reasons" exist for declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4).
A. Keeping It Simple. Applying §§ 1367(c) (1) and (3)
Section 1367(c)(1), permitting a court to relinquish jurisdiction
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
179. Id § 1367(c)(1).
180. I& § 1367(c)(2).
181. Id § 1367(c)(3).
182. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
1020
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
when a state claim "raises a novel or complex issue of State law," was
recognized by the Gibbs Court as a valid reason for declining to ex-
ercise pendent jurisdiction, and appears to be merely a codification of
that case."' Though Professor Siegel believes that § 1367(c)(1) is a
codification of the doctrine of Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 14-commonly referred to as the "Pullman absten-
tion"-this theory is without basis or logic. The Pullman abstention
does require a district court to abstain from making decisions of state
law when the state issue is novel or unclear.'85 The Pullman absten-
tion's goal, however, is to allow a state court to interpret its own law,
in the hope that this interpretation will avoid the constitutional issue
entirely."" Section 1367(c)(1), on the other hand, is intended to avoid
"[n]eedless decisions of state law.., as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-
footed reading of applicable law."'1 7 Section 1367(c)(1) is grounded
on principles of federalism rather than avoidance of constitutional
federal questions. Apart from problems that predictably arise from
the use of terms such as "novel" and "complex," subsection (c)(1) has
been applied with little difficulty.
Section 1367(c)(3) is perhaps the easiest of the § 1367(c) excep-
tions to apply. Providing that a district judge "may" relinquish sup-
plemental jurisdiction if the main claim is dismissed, subsection
1367(c)(3) codifies a long-recognized exception to the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction,'8 permitting a court to, at its discretion, relin-
quish supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims once the ju-
risdictional "crutch"-the claim that supports the supplemental ju-
risdiction of the other claim or claims-is removed. There is no
longer any reason for a federal court to hear such state claims."' Al-
ternatively, the court may retain jurisdiction over what is now a
wholly state law matter between nondiverse parties "in order to save
the parties the expense of having to try the pendent claim twice."''
Section 1367(c)(3) is merely a codification of the well-
183. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,726 (1966).
184. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
185. See id at 499-500.
186. See i&.
187. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
188. See id.
189. See Siegel, supra note 34, at 835.
190. See Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1182 (citing Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d
233, 243 (7th Cir. 1991); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 458-59
(7th Cir. 1982)).
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established and sound policy of judicial economy expressed in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.191 It is straightforward and should be applied
in an identical manner whether the case involves two plaintiffs, one
raising a federal question and the other raising only state law claims,
or one plaintiff bringing both federal and state claims and having all
federal claims dismissed before trial.192
B. A Rose by Any Other Name...: Discretion to Decline Jurisdiction
When State Issues Predominate
Subsection (c)(2) allows a district court to decline the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if "the claim substantially pre-
dominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction."' 3 Whether state law issues subtantially pre-
dominate over federal issues "is a 'value judgment' for the court."
1 94
"The question comes down to whether the state law claims... re-
quire more judicial resources to adjudicate or are more salient in the
case as a whole than the federal law claims."' 95 "This is a qualitative
rather than quantitative inquiry.,
196
Clark v. Milam involved a civil action brought pursuant to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute.
The plaintiff alleged two RICO claims and five claims arising under
state law.19 In holding that the state claims did not predominate over
the RICO claims, the Clark court found that the two RICO counts
were both at the heart of the complaint and were the most complex. 9
Moreover, while not all defendants were named in the two RICO
counts and while the RICO counts were only two of the seven in the
complaint, these quantitative considerations were not dispositive in
191. See 383 U.S. at 726.
192. See, e.g., Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191-
92 (2d Cir. 1996).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (1994).
194. Clark v. Milam, 813 F. Supp. 431, 435 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (citing Moore v.
DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (D.N.J. 1991); Martin v. Drummond Coal Co.,
Inc., 756 F. Supp. 524,527 (N.D. Ala. 1991)).
195. Id (citing Moore, 766 F. Supp. at 1319).
196. Id (citing Moore, 766 F. Supp. at 1319 n.15).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994). Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
civil RICO actions. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990). The Clark
court's analysis, therefore, would presumably apply in any action involving a fed-
eral question over which there is concurrent jurisdiction.
198. See Clark, 813 F. Supp. at 435.
199. See id. at 434-35.
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the court's analysis.200 Ultimately, neither consideration changed the
court's conclusion that remand under § 1367(c)(2) was inappropri-
ate.
201
Though some courts and commentators have suggested that
courts should interpret and apply § 1367(c)(2) co-extensively with the
Burford abstention doctrine, this approach unduly restricts Con-
gress's intent in enacting § 1367. On its face, § 1367(c)(2) appears to
codify United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, which held that federal juris-
diction should not be exercised over pendent claims "if it appears
that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of
proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness
of the remedy sought."203 The factors cited by the Gibbs court for
when state issues might substantially predominate so as to warrant
declining jurisdiction under what is now codified as § 1367(c)(2), are
not particularly relevant to a Burford abstention analysis. Rather,
the intent of Congress in enacting § 1367(c)(2) was to prevent plain-
tiffs from joining a tenuous federal claim to what is essentially a mat-
ter of state law in order to gain entrance into a federal forum ,°5
200. See id. at 435.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating that a "district court, when exercising its discretion [in declining to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim in which state law predominates] is
invoking the [Burford] abstention doctrine"); see also Siegel, supra note 34, at
835.
203. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d
780,789-90 (3d Cir. 1995).
204. The Burford abstention generally arises in non-federal question cases.
See Vairo, supra note 10, at 159. In a typical Burford case, the plaintiff alleges
state law claims implicating important state regulatory issues and, in particular,
where state courts are part of the regulatory process. See id. If these factors are
present, the federal court will abstain "out of considerations of comity and re-
spect for the paramount state interest." Id. A court determining whether to ab-
stain under Burford will not be concerned with the terms of proof, the scope of
the issues raised, or the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought except as these
factors apply to the state regulatory process of which the state courts are an inte-
gral component. See id.
205. This reasoning has found support among federal appellate panels, creat-
ing a split of authority as to the interpretation of subsection (c)(2). An analysis
of this split, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For purposes of this
Comment, citation to the Third Circuit's decision in Borough of West Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, is sufficient. The Lancaster court held that a district court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) when "a
state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only
an appendage," and that district courts should examine whether the state claims
substantially predominate in terms of proof, comprehensiveness of the remedy
sought, and the scope of the issues raised. 1d. at 789 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
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and to prevent courts from making "[n]eedless decisions of state
law. ', 2°1 While § 1367(c)(1) generally addresses concerns over fed-
eral courts needlessly deciding issues of state law, such concerns have
implications here as well. Palivos v. City of Chicago207 presents a good
example of how these concerns may be relevant under § 1367(c)(2).
Palivos involved a three-count complaint brought against the
City of Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley, and Alderman Joseph
Moore. 2° Plaintiff Peter Palivos alleged that the defendants arbitrar-
ily refused to issue him a building permit even though he had com-
plied with all the applicable building code requirements and had al-
ready received approval from the city's building department.20 9
Palivos sought a writ of mandamus directing the issuance of the
building permit and a declaratory judgment stating that he was enti-• . 210
tied to renovate his property. He also brought a § 1983 claim
against Joseph Moore, apparently alleging the deprivation of a prop-
erty interest without due process.
Palivos brought his suit in state court, and the defendants
promptly removed it to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).21 -
Palivos then sought to remand the entire case to state court, relying
727). The Third Circuit's analysis has been adopted by district courts outside
that circuit as well. See, e.g., Neal v. Flav-O-Rich, Inc., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1816, 1819 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (following the Third Circuit's Lancaster
opinion and holding that district courts should look to Gibbs when determining
whether state issues "substantially predominate"). If it is apparent to the district
court that a plaintiff has added tenuous federal claims simply to get into federal
court, such circumstances might also present "other compelling reasons" for de-
clining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4). See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
206. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The Gibbs Court counseled that needless deci-
sions of state law should be avoided "both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of ap-
plicable law." Id-
207. 901 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
208. See id. at 272.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 272-73.
212. See id. at 272. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) provides that "[a]ny civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right
arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be re-
movable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) (1994). The Palivos defendants also asserted that they also could have
removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See Palivos, 901 F. Supp. at 272 n.1
(holding that § 1441(a) removal would not have affected the outcome of Palivos's
motion to remand). This subsection provides for the removal of "any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).21 In granting the plaintiff's motion to remand
the state claims, the court held that the focus of the complaint was
the refusal of the city to issue a building permit, which the plaintiff
claimed the city lacked discretion to withhold.214 Whether the city
had any such discretion was purely a matter of local law and, there-
fore, "more properly entrusted to state courts., 21 5 The court further
held that resolution of the state issues would have a significant im-
pact on Palivos's § 1983 suit, most importantly because state law de-
termined whether the plaintiff possessed a property right at all.
216
Even though the court could not remand the plaintiff's entire case, it
avoided making a needless decision of state law by remanding the
state claims and abstaining from deciding a federal issue over which
state law predominated.
217
213. See Palivos, 901 F. Supp. at 272. Section 1441(c) provides that
"[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the ju-
risdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more oth-
erwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters in which State law predominates." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(emphasis added). Though a federal court is empowered to adjudicate the joined
state claims, a plaintiff may always seek the remand of state claims which a de-
fendant has removed under § 1441 as part of an action partially comprised of a
federal claim or claims. See id. Though the remand of properly removed federal
claims is generally not possible, even the federal components of an action com-
prised of state and federal claims and removed under § 1441(c) may, "in [the
court's] discretion," be remanded if state law predominates over them. Id. Pali-
vos's § 1983 suit for the deprivation of a property right, where state law deter-
mined whether a property right even existed, presents a good example of when
state law predominates over a federal issue. Showing the predominance of the
state claims, however, "is only half the battle" for a plaintiff like Palivos who, in
seeking remand of an entire cause of action under § 1441(c) "must also demon-
strate the existence of a 'separate and independent claim.' Palivos, 901 F. Supp.
at 272-73 (citing American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951)). Be-
cause Palivos failed to meet this stringent standard, the court refused to remand
the entire case under § 1441(c). See id. at 273.
If a plaintiffs various claims are not "separate and independent" and are
removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) or (b), a defendant may only seek to remand
the plaintiff's state law claims, and not the entire case. This is so because §§
1441(a) and (b), unlike § 1441(c), do not themselves contain remand clauses.
Therefore, a plaintiff's only option is to invoke § 1367(c), which permits district
courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby effect the remand of,
state claims only, and not properly removed federal claims. See supra notes 68-
70 and accompanying text.
214. See Palivos, 901 F. Supp. at 273.
215. Id. (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
216. See id.
217. The Pullman abstention was appropriate in Palivos because decision on
the issue of state law had the potential to resolve or moot the federal constitu-
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Whenever the scope of the issues raised and the terms of proof
involved with state law claims so effect the viability of federal claims,
a district court should refuse to hear the state claims and instead re-
mand them for state adjudication. If plaintiffs like Palivos prevail on
their state law claims and still desire to pursue a civil rights claim or
other federal remedy, they can return to the federal courts, which can
then benefit from the guidance of the state courts' interpretation of
state law. A separate but related reason to decline jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c)(2) may be that the state and federal claims have identical
dispositive issues, with the federal claim having a lower standard of
proof.2
C. Giving Meaning to the Catch-All: When "Other Compelling
Reasons" to Decline Jurisdiction Exist
Under § 1367(c)(4), a district court may decline to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over a claim if, "in exceptional circumstances,
there are... compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction., 21 9 Other
than requiring a district court "to undertake a case-specific analysis"
when deciding to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4), the House
Report gives little guidance as to how this category should be ap-
plied.22 Not suprisingly, federal courts have not treated this subsec-
tion uniformly. ' This Subpart discusses scholarly commentary on
the meaning of § 1367(c)(4), reviews recent cases decided on § 1367(c)(4)
grounds, and proposes other reasons that future courts may find to be
"compelling."
Professor Georgene Vairon and other legal scholars2 have sug-
tional claim. Even absent the constitutional avoidance issue, a similar result may
be attained in many states by remanding the state claims and certifying the fed-
eral issue-over which state law predominates-to the state courts for determi-
nation.
218. This situation may also comprise "other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction" under § 1367(c)(4). See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (1994).
220. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875.
221. Compare Carlucci v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that "'exceptional circumstances [and] compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.' existed because "permitting these various third party ac-
tions to continue during the pendency of the Government's ... proceedings"
would be inefficient and "would simply prolong and complicate the proceed-
ings") with Executive Software North America, Inc. v. District Court, 24 F.3d
1545, 1560-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (expressly disapproving of remand under §
1367(c)(4) when adjudication would require the substantial expenditure of time
and effort by the federal court).
222. See Vairo, supra note 10, at 153.
223. See, e.g., Patrick D. Murphy, A Federal Practitioner's Guide to Supple-
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gested that § 1367(c)(4)'s "exceptional circumstances" language is
taken from the Supreme Court's opinion in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States.224 Discussing the doctrine of
abstention in the majority's opinion in Colorado River, Justice Bren-
nan held that the "'[a]bdication of [a district court's] obligation to
decide cases can be justified under this [abstention] doctrine only in
the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair
to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing in-
terest."' Justice Brennan further stated that prior decisions of the
Supreme Court had "confined [these exceptional] circumstances ap-
propriate for abstention to three general categories:6 (1) "'cases
presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or
presented in a different posture by a state court determination of
pertinent state law;' that is, the Pullman abstention;w (2) cases
"where there have been presented difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose impor-
tance transcends the result in the case then at bar;" that is, the Bur-
ford abstention; s and (3) cases where there are certain ongoing state
proceedings; that is, the Younger abstention. Situations such as
these-which warrant abstention in order to serve "an important
countervailing interest"' 230 --would undoubtedly qualify as
"exceptional circumstances" in which there are "compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction" under § 1367(c)(4).
mental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 973, 1028 n.288
(1995) (drawing an "imperfect analogy" between § 1367(c)(4) and the Colorado
River abstention).
224. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
225. Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).
226. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
227. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 189 and citing Pullman, 312
U.S. 496). For a discussion of the Pullman abstention, see supra notes 184-86
and accompanying text.
228. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943)). For a discussion of the Burford abstention, see supra note 204 and
accompanying text.
229. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)). Though the Younger decision was formerly limited to abstention where,
"absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdic-
tion has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings,"
id. (emphasis added), the Younger doctrine has been modified by subsequent
case law to include civil proceedings in state courts. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (holding that the Younger abstention applies in both
civil and criminal proceedings).
230. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at
189).
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The Colorado River case itself involved "the effect of the
McCarran Amendment? upon the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1345m over suits for determination of water
rights brought by the United States as trustee for certain Indian
tribes and as owner of various non-Indian Government claims. ' 33
The United States brought a suit in federal court on its own behalf
and on behalf of two Indian tribes, seeking a declaration of water
rights.2 Shortly after the Government's suit had commenced, a de-
fendant to that suit sought to join the United States as a defendant to
an ongoing state proceeding "for the purpose of adjudicating all of
the Government's claims, both state and federal. '235 Several defen-
dants and intervenors in the federal action then filed a motion to
dismiss the Government's case "on the ground[s] that under the
[McCarran] Amendment, the [district] court was without jurisdiction
to determine federal water rights." 6 Without deciding the jurisdic-
tional issue, the district court dismissed the case, stating that "the
doctrine of abstention required deference to the [state] proceed-
ings. '237 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that abstention was inappropriate. 38
Though the case fell within none of the traditional abstention
categories, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of "principles
unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and
regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving
the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by
federal courts or by state and federal courts."23' In addition to the
three situations which traditionally warrant abstention by the federal
courts, the Colorado River Court stated that even more narrow
231. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). In substance, the McCarran Amendment, also
known as the McCarran Water Rights Suit Act, amounts to congressional con-
sent to the joinder of the United States as a defendant in certain suits for the ad-
judication or administration of rights to use the water of a river system or other
source, as well as the abrogation of a state's right to claim sovereign immunity
from such suits.
232. Section 1345 provides for original district court jurisdiction over "all civil
actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency
or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. §
1345 (1994).
233. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 803.
234. See id. at 805.
235. 1d. at 806.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
239. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
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"exceptional circumstances" might warrant the dismissal of a federal
action "for reasons of wise judicial administration," in the absence of
"weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-
federal relations."' While "as between state and federal courts, the
rule is that 'the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction,"' the Colorado River Court cited a "general principle...
to avoid duplicative litigation" in reversing the Tenth Circuit and in
affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint.24 1 If the three
traditional abstention doctrines present "exceptional circumstances"
where "other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction" exist un-
der § 1367(c)(4), certainly so do the even narrower circumstances
where a dismissal is warranted "for reasons of wise judicial admini-
stration."242
The idea that procedural scenarios appropriate for dismissal un-
der Colorado River also fit within § 1367(c)(4) found support from
the Fifth Circuit in its opinion in Hays County Guardian v. Supple.U3
In an opinion by Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, the Fifth Circuit
found "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling reasons" to de-
cline jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims when adjudicating
those claims in federal court "while identical claims are pending in
state court would be a pointless waste of judicial resources."
214
Lower courts have also found "exceptional circumstances" to
exist due to the possibility of jury confusion, which the Gibbs Court
recognized as a justification for declining jurisdiction.245 In Padilla v.
City of Saginaw,m the court weighed the likelihood of jury confusion
against the economy which might result from the resolution of all
240. Id. at 818.
241. Id at 817.
242. Id. at 818. When "assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event
of an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction," the Colorado River Court stated that a
district court should consider: (1) which court had first obtained jurisdiction
over a particular res; (2) "the inconvenience of the federal forum;" (3) "the de-
sirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;" and (4) "the order in which jurisdic-
tion was obtained by the concurrent forums." Id. One counter argument to a
stay or dismissal under Colorado River is that abstention is unnecessary because
the Colorado River abstention, unlike other traditional abstention doctrines, is
grounded in "reasons of wise judicial administration" and not based on principles
of federalism, which at least find support in the Constitution.
243. 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992).
244. Id. at 125.
245. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,727 (1966).
246. 867 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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counts in a single court as required by Moor v. County of Alameda.24
The Padilla court found that the potential for jury confusion in the
case was "great" because "[t]he state claims and [the] federal claims
[had] different legal standards, rules of vicarious liability and immu-
nity, and recoverable damages," all of which "would be very difficult
for a jury to keep... straight."24'
In Council of Unit Owners of the Wisp Condominium, Inc. v.
Recreational Industries, Inc. ,249 the district court also found that
"exceptional circumstances" and "other compelling reasons for de-
clining jurisdiction" existed under § 1367(c)(4). In dicta, the Wisp
Condominium court stated that the plaintiff's federal claims were
"rather tenuous and were asserted primarily to open up a federal fo-
rum."' 250 The Wisp Condominium court cited United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, stating that "a federal district court need not tolerate attempts
by a litigant to litigate an essentially state law case in the federal fo-
rum." While the Wisp Condominium court disposed of the plain-
tiff's state claims on the ground that they did not arise from the same
nucleus of operative facts as did the plaintiff's federal claims,212 the
court stated that, assuming that they had arisen from the same facts,
the addition of tenuous federal claims for the purpose of forum
shopping also "represent[ed] an exceptional circumstance where
247. 411 U.S. 693,716 (1973).
248. Padilla, 867 F. Supp at 1315-16.
249. 793 F. Supp. 120 (D. Md. 1992).
250. Id. at 123.
251. Id (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727).
252. See id. at 122. This is, of course, another argument available to a defen-
dant's attorney seeking the dismissal of state claims. In declining jurisdiction
over plaintiff's claims for preliminary and permanent injunction barring Recrea-
tional Industries from competing with the plaintiff, the Wisp Condominium court
stated that "[n]ot every dispute that arises between parties litigating a federal
claim constitutes a part of the same Article III case, and the present dispute ex-
emplifies those that do not." Id. The plaintiff in Wisp Condominium alleged
that defendant had violated federal antitrust law. See id. The court held that
"[a]lthough part of an ongoing, bitter dispute between [the] plaintiff and defen-
dant regarding the operation of the Wisp Resort Hotel," the state claim did not
"arise from the same 'operative facts' as the antitrust case, nor would it ordinar-
ily be tried together with the plaintiff's antitrust claims." Id.
In dicta, the Wisp Condominium court stated that, even assuming satis-
faction of the Gibbs "common nucleus" test, the court would decline to exercise
its jurisdiction over the state claims because they predominated over the federal
antitrust claims upon which the court's jurisdiction would hypothetically rest.
See id. at 123. The court reiterated the emphasis of the Gibbs court that the fed-
eral courts had discretionary power to hear pendent state law claims and stated
that this discretion had been preserved in § 1367(c)(2). See id.
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sound and compelling reasons exist[ed] under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)
to decline [supplemental] jurisdiction over the plaintiff's ... claim.
''259
In addition to the reasons cited above, courts will doubtlessly find
other "compelling reasons" for declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4).
In determining whether "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling
reasons" exist for declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4), a court
should look to the guidance of the Supreme Court, handed down
through its opinion in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.2" This analysis
is likely also in accord with Congress's intent in enacting subsection
(c), which appears to be more or less a codification of the Gibbs fac-
tors for when a district court should use its discretion to decline ju-
risdiction. Though the only "jurisdictional consideration"-other
than those codified in subsections (c)(1)-(3)-cited by the Gibbs
Court for declining jurisdiction was "the likelihood of jury confusion
in treating divergent legal theories of relief,"25 the Court used this
reason by way of example only and left open the door for other pos-
sible "compelling reasons." '
In determining when reasons argued are compelling, a district
court should look to considerations of "judicial economy, conven-
ience and fairness to litigants"2--those same values that the Gibbs
Court determined should be looked to when considering whether
pendent jurisdiction should be exercised. If these values were not
met, the Gibbs Court counseled that a district court should refrain
from exercising the jurisdiction that existed when federal and state claims
arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact[s]." 8 Finally, a district
court should inquire whether federal or state treatment of the claims is
more "expedien[t] and efficien[t]" 9 --the interests initially sought to be
vindicated by the creation of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and the
avoidance of claim splitting.2m For example, if a state court system pro-
vides for a "fast track" or similar vehicle for bringing a case to trial
more expediently, these interests would be served by sending the liti-
gants to state court, particularly if other reasons for declining juris-
diction also exist; for example, the state and federal claims have
identical dispositive issues, or the only remaining federal issues are
253. 1& at 123.
254. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
255. IL at 727.
256. See id.
257. 1& at 726.
258. 1& at 725.
259. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984).
260. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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legal issues that may be disposed of through summary judgment or
another post-state trial hearing in the federal court.26'
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Congress has codified the doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction in § 1367 and, in so doing, has created jurisdic-
tion over pendent parties, the language of § 1367 has left many ques-
tions unanswered. Exacerbating the problem, no post-enactment Su-
preme Court decision has attempted to interpret § 1367's provisions.
Until guidance in answering these questions is provided, the lower
federal courts should focus on and follow the plain language of the
statute. The provisions of § 1367 are reconcilable, and the literal
application of § 1367 does not lead to absurd results. Rather, it leads
to the most logical conclusion-in enacting § 1367, Congress intended
to preserve the discretion which Gibbs vested in the district courts.
When faced with one or more of the many questions § 1367 has
left unanswered, lower courts should look to that Supreme Court
authority which we do have-United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.'62
Though the Gibbs decision antedates the enactment of § 1367, it dis-
cussed the policies underlying the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,
and its language later provided the very foundation on which Con-
gress built our supplemental jurisdiction statute.
Joseph N. Akrotirianakis*
261. This argument is further bolstered if the federal issues have a lower stan-
dard of proof than the state issues. In addition, if the parties have a right to a
jury trial on the state but not the federal issues, it would serve these interests to
hold a state jury trial, and then a less time-consuming court trial-or, if only legal
issues remain, summary judgment hearing-in the federal court.
262. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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